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ABSTRACT 
This essay analyses shifts in Greek foreign policy behaviour with regard 
to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the early 1990s to 
the late 2000s, with a particular emphasis on the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
Summit. In this paper, I attempt to provide an understanding of foreign 
policy decisions that examines the interplay of all the international, 
domestic and individual levels of analysis. Two parallel analyses take 
place: first, a historical analysis, showing how international 
threats/opportunities and domestic variables shape the strategic 
adjustments of the Greek Foreign Policy Executives (FPE); secondly, an 
intuitive analysis of the rationale behind the ‘Greek blocking’ based on 
the role of ‘permeable’ perceptions of Greeks on security, (negotiating) 
power and national interest.  
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Why did Greece block the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the Former Yugoslav Republic  
of Macedonia? An Analysis  
of Greek Foreign Policy Behaviour Shifts 
 
 
1. Introduction 
At the April 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, Greece convinced its 
partners and allies that the accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (hereafter FYR Macedonia) to NATO should be postponed 
until a resolution could be found with respect to its constitutional name. 
One year later, the European Council decided to postpone the opening 
of EU membership talks with FYR Macedonia on account of Greek 
objections.  
The objections to the accession of FYR Macedonia to both international 
organisations stem from an international dispute over the name of 
Greece’s neighbour (the Name Issue) dating from 1991, when the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from 
Yugoslavia. In 1995, Greece recognised FYR Macedonia with this 
provisional name by signing the Interim Accord, which inter alia pledged 
the two states to continue the UN-sponsored negotiations with a view to 
reaching an agreement in conformity with Resolutions 817 and 845 of 
the UN Security Council (see Zaikos, 2003).  
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Since then, the negotiation talks have often stagnated reaching no 
concrete results. The legal dimension of the Name Issue (namely, the 
sporadic proposals of the UN Secretary General special envoy) will not 
concern this paper’s question, inasmuch as any ultimate resolution 
would require the decision to be taken at the highest political level, that 
is, the Greek Foreign Policy Executive (FPE). 
In this analysis, I use the theoretical model proposed by Lobell, Ripsman 
and Taliaferro in their book Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign 
Policy (2009) –hereafter referred as LRT– that academically belongs to 
Neoclassical Realism
1
. According to this model, foreign policy is seen 
through the lens of the FPE which personifies the state. The FPE 
examines the external stimuli that come from the international/regional 
environment. Meanwhile, whether the FPE’s response quality to an 
external stimulus is the optimal
2
 or not, depends on the impact of 
intervening variables in the process of decision making. For instance, a 
lack of autonomy of the FPE, resulting from societal and institutional 
structures inclusive of the leverage of public opinion, the elites and 
other interest groups can have an impact on FPE’s response (e.g. 
Christensen, 1996, Ripsman, 2002). In particular, LRT pay tribute to how 
the FPE in charge assesses the international threats/opportunities and 
                                                 
1 Neo-classical realism is an academic endeavour to re-examine political realism and, mainly, 
its newer version, neorealism, in foreign policy theorising (thereon, see Wohlforth, 2008). 
Neorealism, dogmatically, theorises that political leaders are working self-evidently for the 
state and take only rational decisions relative to the distribution of power. By and large, 
neorealists disdain any analysis focusing on domestic or human levels of a state by giving 
emphasis to systemic explanations of foreign policy decisions (see Waltz, 1979). 
2 For LRT, an optimal choice tends to be equated with a rational choice in that a. it is 
provided with a clear assessment of external stimuli and b. it provides clear information on 
strategic responses. 
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what kind of strategic adjustments are followed according to 
assessments previously made (Lobell, 2009).  
Another issue under LRT consideration is perceptions. Perceptions affect 
the formulation of foreign policy and in combination with intervening 
domestic pressures may, in turn, distort a rational foreign policy choice 
based on purely international demands; in the same vein, national 
interest becomes dependent on these perceptions of the FPE (Dueck, 
2009). As for perceptions, psychological, cultural and historical factors 
may affect how political actors perceive their own and others’ 
capabilities (Rose, 1998: 168). 
What makes LRT’s book most interesting is that it stipulates that FPEs’ 
behaviour can change in time, by generating different models of foreign 
policy. To sketch out potential models, LRT propose three basic worlds in 
their conclusions: World 1 gives fully systemic explanations to foreign 
policy decisions; World 2 complies with the conditions of neoclassical 
realism (international environment-oriented decisions affected by 
domestic variables), while in World 3 decisions are better explained by 
domestic factors (LRT, 2009: 283).  
My purpose is to apply the main argumentation of LRT, in order to 
detect how threat/opportunity assessments, and strategic adjustments 
change in Greek Foreign Policy vis-à-vis FYR Macedonia from the early 
1990s to the late 2000s (part 1): I define three behavioural models and 
argue that there is a shift from what LRT call World 3 to World 1.  
In brief, the first period (1991-1995) represents one of high-level 
international threats with a direct impact on Greek state/society 
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relations and leads to a less rational approach of foreign policy towards 
FYR Macedonia. The second period (1995-2006) constitutes a U-turn of 
Greek external behavior, based on more international opportunities with 
a reverse impact on Greek state/society relations. It entails a more 
rational approach towards FYR Macedonia involving economic 
penetration and institutional integrationist incentives. The third period 
(2006-2009) constitutes a rather pragmatic change of strategic 
adjustment, free from domestic pressure and is marked by the role of 
timing as international opportunity. 
From this historical analysis, two legitimate questions are engendered: 
Why the strategic adjustment of economic interdependence and the 
incentive of Euro-Atlantic integration for FYR Macedonia, though a 
rational choice, did not help to resolve a bilateral dispute and why the 
more powerful part of the dispute in question, Greece, could not exert 
the necessary influence for this purpose? In part 2, an intuitive analysis 
proposes some answers: a reflection on the Greek blocking by examining 
the role of perceptions in foreign policy, explores how Greek perceptions 
on security, power and national interest affected the Name Issue. This 
dual historical and intuitive analysis of the paper allows for more 
convincing answers about questions of foreign policy of a complicated 
nature, which an analyst should be aware of. 
For the analysis of the third model (2006-2009), four Greek officials have 
been interviewed: the then Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Valinakis; 
the then Greek Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Stylianidis; the then 
Secretary General for European Affairs of the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs, Mr Katsoudas, and a high-level foreign policy advisor of the 
Greek government.  
 
2.  Three models of Greek Foreign Policy behaviour towards FYR 
Macedonia 
2.1. First model (1991-1995) 
Due to systemic imperatives, the Greek FPE for almost forty years after 
the end of the Greek Civil War (1949) did not raise any substantial 
objections to the denomination of the southern republic of the Socialist 
Yugoslavia as ‘Macedonia’; a name that describes a broader 
geographical region, the largest part of which is Greek territory. On the 
one hand, the bipolar system of the Cold War would require good 
relations between the West and Tito’s Yugoslavia; on the other hand, 
after 1974, Greece would have to counter-balance a high-level threat on 
the east (Turkey), from which its allies were not willing to fully defend it. 
Therefore, the strategic adjustment would require the Greek FPE to 
cooperate with Yugoslavia, neglecting the slow and steady building of a 
Slav Macedonian identity
3
. 
In 1991-1995, Greek foreign policy was dominated by both extreme 
uncertainty and change in the international and Balkan environment and 
a strong interplay with domestic politics, public opinion, the media, civil 
                                                 
3 In this paper, I will technically use the term ‘Slav Macedonians’, when I refer to the FPE of 
FYR Macedonia. ‘Slav Mecedonians’ is the English equivalent of the Greek term 
‘Σλαβομακεδόνες’ which a great part of Greek bibliography uses, when referring to the 
people of FYR Macedonia. According to this view, ‘Macedonians’ is a geographical 
designation rather than ethnological and pertains to the nations that used to or live in the 
geographical region of Macedonia. Accordingly, we can distinguish Greek Macedonians in 
Greece, Bulgarian Macedonians in Bulgaria and Slav Macedonians and Albanian 
Macedonians in FYR Macedonia. 
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society and the electorate (see Tsoukalis, 1996: 26-28). The first, far 
from facilitating, contributed to risky threat and opportunity 
assessments, while the second to a distortion of a strategy appropriate 
for an unstable regional environment of intense renationalisation of 
Balkan politics, irredentism, hatred and war. 
a. International threats/opportunities assessments  
In the early 1990s, Greece had to confront not only Turkey as a threat 
but, also its loss of her Balkan strategic ‘cushion’, Yugoslavia. Instead, 
the fledgling FYR Macedonia would, officially, follow practices of 
extreme nationalism: use of ancient Greek symbols on its flag, 
irredentist articles in its new Constitution, anti-Greek propaganda in the 
education system, etc. (see Axt, 1997: 172).  
Second, by adopting a ‘worst-case-scenario’ approach in its threat 
assessments, Greece assessed that it would be encircled by client states 
to Turkey (Albania, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia), the so-called 
‘Muslim arc’. Indeed, Turkish diplomacy, since the mid-1980s, had 
approached Skopje, while since the early 1990s it inaugurated an 
‘economic facilities’ provision with Skopje and Tirana (see Constas, 1995: 
91-92; Wallden, 2003: 433-435). Instead of facing this rapprochement by 
tending a hand of friendship, Greece adopted defensive reflexes.  
Hence, the assessment of the Greek–FYR Macedonia relations was one 
of a win-lose approach. However, potential security dilemmas were not 
based on the real distribution of power (Slav Macedonians were 
economically and politically weaker). During this period, less security for 
FYR Macedonia meant more security for Greece, which eventually 
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resorted to the logic of a regional balance of power and found her ally in 
the face of Serbia (see Michas, 2002). 
Finally, the seemingly ‘negative’ performance of the Europeans and 
NATO in the Balkans impacted the FPE’s assessment of the situation 
(Eyal, 1996: 144; see Tsakaloyannis, 2005: 447). The inadequacy of the 
newly established EU Common Foreign and Security Policy to enforce 
peace in the region gave the impression to Greece that it should follow a 
self-willed approach with ‘instinctive’ strategic adjustments. Unlike 
Greeks, Europeans wanted, by any means, stability in FYR Macedonia; 
the Name Issue would complicate things (see Larrabee in Constas, 1995: 
88). 
b. Domestic variables  
Research has revealed that collective public opinion changes abruptly 
during periods of high threat, because ‘uncertainty about the intentions 
of allies and adversaries is high’
 
(Isernia, Juhász, Rattinger, 2002: 222). In 
the early 1990s, Greeks reacted strongly sentimentally. Robert Kaplan 
eloquently narrates: ‘When in late 1991, Yugoslav Macedonia declared 
its independence as ‘Macedonia’, Greece went wild. Hundreds of 
thousands of people demonstrated in the streets of Salonica, and the 
Greek army went on border ‘maneuvers’’ (Kaplan, 2005: 281). 
Indeed, public opinion and civil society, inclusive of the Greek Orthodox 
Church, during this period, expressed their nationalistic sentiments, 
having a clear impact on the FPE’s strategic adjustments and choices 
(see Kalaitzidis, 2010: 69-80). Moreover, the media had a role of 
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seconding the people’s reactions for Greek Macedonia by fomenting 
nationalism (Mitropoulos, 2003: 289). 
 On the other hand, other intervening variables were even more 
determinate. Both the opposition party (socialists) and the internal 
governing party opposition (right-wing) were expressing maximalist 
positions contrary to premier Mitsotakis who was indifferent about the 
Name Issue, leading shortly thereafter to the collapse of his government: 
different perceptions on foreign policy between Mitsotakis and his 
Foreign Minister, Samaras, led the latter to resign and found a new party 
(see Ifantis, 1996: 152-153). 
c. Strategic adjustments 
Both Mitsotakis and the next government’s (socialist) FPE strategic 
adjustment involved a multiparty decision (1992) to pledge all future 
governments not to accept the term ‘Macedonia’ and its derivatives for 
the name of the neighboring state, thus, creating a strong political 
dependence path until 2007. Second, there was a clear preference for 
negative instruments of foreign policy: one partial (1993) and one 
complete embargo (1994) was set in place. In addition, Greece 
attempted in the framework of international organisations to dissuade 
countries from recognizing the new state, and block the accession of FYR 
Macedonia to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
and the Council of Europe. Regarding the EU, Greece tried to invoke the 
solidarity principle (Eyal, 1996: 144), until Europeans were forced to 
withdraw their support for Greece for the sake of regional stability.  
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The Greek FPE has received severe criticism as being unready for the 
great challenge of the post-communist era (Koppa, 2005): Greece could 
have interpreted its proximity to the Balkans as an international 
opportunity to become a stabilising factor. Yet, it is vague whether the 
Balkan states would readily respond. Indeed, Greece was ‘chastised by 
paternalistic Europeans for not behaving like civilised Scandinavians’ 
(Tsoukalis, 1996: 28). The early 1990s saw in the face of Greece a ‘Balkan 
Israel’ which many times exaggerated, on account of bad historical 
memories and potential security threats (ibid: 26).  
According to LRT, the model of 1991-1995 was a sort of a partial 
combination of World 3 and World 2: Even though domestic variables 
were not the exclusive factor that led to the strategic choices of the FPE, 
the outcome of the FPE position would be different without them, both 
because Mitsotakis had a different point of view on the issue and 
because the next socialist premier Andreas Papandreou had raised 
expectations before the elections. To conclude, the difficulty in assessing 
clearly the international threats and opportunities and the low level 
autonomy of the FPE from society and politics both affected strategic 
adjustment, bringing in elements of irrationality. 
 
2.2. Second model (1995-2006) 
In 1995, the Interim Accord imposed by American diplomacy (see 
Holbrooke’s book mentioned in Tziampiris, 2003: 100) was ‘manna from 
heaven’ both for the Greeks and the Slav Macedonians. As for Greece, it 
removed a thorny political issue without retreating from the 1992 
multiparty decision. As for FYR Macedonia, the Greek embargo was 
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removed and the state was recognised by Greece. Yet, the Interim 
Accord left the Name Issue unresolved. It was a formula that provided 
the framework for a final resolution. This was disregarded: the Greek 
FPEs did not interpret the dynamics of the Accord’s time space, while 
the other side remained satisfied with the Name Issue as becoming a 
forgotten dispute. 
What differentiates the first model of Greek behaviour from the second 
is the decrease of direct threats coming from FYR Macedonia, the 
absence of the sense of surprise, prevalent in the 1991 events, and the 
increase of international opportunities. This had corollaries on the 
perceptions of the FPE, with strategic adjustments being facilitated by 
domestic developments adaptive to positive external stimuli. 
a. International threats/opportunities assessment 
At the outset, two incidents regarding international threats led Greece 
to reassess its relations with FYR Macedonia. The Turkish threat 
resurfaced with the Imia Crisis five months after the Interim Accord, and 
the developments concerning Kosovo’s secession (1999) and the 
Albanian Macedonian uprising (2001), led Greece to revise its security 
dilemmas. Gradually, Greece saw in the face of FYR Macedonia a buffer 
zone that would prevent the Albanian aspirations for a Greater Albania 
from materializing (see, Couloumbis & Yannas, 1996: 169): Greece, then, 
looked for respect for existent borders and minority rights. To satisfy 
these threat assessments, Greece opted for a ‘De-macedonisation’ of its 
foreign policy which had an impact on the Name Issue per se: internal 
stability issues and the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country became 
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more important. The ‘win-lose’ approach to relations with FYR 
Macedonia became a thing of the past. 
In addition, international opportunities in the region rendered the Greek 
FPE less insecure. The improved performance of the European initiatives 
in the Balkans and the normative role of the EU was one opportunity 
(see Tzifakis, 2003). Another came from international fora that made an 
effort to persuade Greece to adopt a more accommodative strategic 
adjustment for FYR Macedonia with a view to establish an economic 
hegemony in the Balkans. According to Joseph Nye:  
‘Like any other nation, Greece possesses two forms of power: hard and 
soft power...while some concentrate their energies on calculating the 
regional balance of hard power, Greece has a tremendous advantage 
over its Balkan neighbours in soft power’ (Nye, 1995: 148). 
The Greek FPE rationally adjusted to the global requirements favouring 
the establishment of a liberal, free and democratic globe based on 
international cooperation, institutional integration and open markets 
(Tsakaloyannis, 2005: 448). The result was the convergence between the 
international community’s (US and EU) objectives in the Balkans and the 
Greek ones (something missing from the first model).  This created a 
new neoliberal ideology in Greek foreign policy: cooperation is easier to 
achieve and offers absolute gains to states; economic welfare is 
preferred to security and international institutions can mitigate anarchy 
(Baldwin in Smith, 2000: 381)
4
.  
                                                 
4 Morgenthau highlights ‘I call an ideology, regardless of the motive or the state of mind of its 
propounder, any system of thought which rationalises or justifies a particular social 
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b. Domestic variables  
This ideological U-turn coincided with a remarkable evolution of the 
Greek state and society. The socialisation of Greece with its European 
counterparts played an important role on this:  The EU had an impact on 
Greek FPE objectives
5
: the most prevalent of them became the entry of 
Greece into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
6
. The Greek 
modernizing government of Simitis (socialists) attempted to introduce 
European practices and trends in domestic processes. ‘According to 
Simitis, Greece meant democracy, the state of law, prosperity, Europe, 
rather than fatherland, religion and family; accordingly, a robust Greece 
was an open, globalised Greece not a xenophobic and traditional one’ 
(Keridis, 2005: 303).  
As a result of reduced uncertainty in international relations and the 
promise of modernisation within Europe, the Greeks in the early-2000s 
prioritised their economic prosperity to their security. According to 
opinion polls, foreign policy issues became of minor importance (3,8 %) 
with the most important issue being unemployment (41,6%) (Metron 
Analysis, 2003). After the Interim Accord, Greek economic interest 
groups penetrated in the market of FYR Macedonia in view of the 
positive climate. Greece became the most important economic partner 
of its neighbour. Bilateral trade soared from $US 57.8 million in 1995 to 
$US 758.5 in 2006. Additionally, between 1995 and 2005, Greek 
investors contributed 20,8% of the  total Foreign Direct Investment in 
                                                                                                                                            
position...ideology is not a propagandistic addition to foreign policy. It is an intrinsic element 
within the foreign policy process itself’ (Morgenthau, 1978: 117-118).  
5 Many scholars describe this impact under the academic title of ‘Europeanisation’ (see 
Lavdas, 1997). 
6 Secondarily, the accession of Cyprus to the EU and, thirdly, organising the Athens 2004 
Olympic Games. 
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FYR Macedonia (Panagiotou, 2008: 69, 75).  Finally, the Greek media 
during this period followed the main trends in society.
7
   
Finally, the Greek FPE at the time was free of the opposition’s and the 
internal opposition’s severe criticism. The new leader of the right-wing 
opposition party, Kostas Karamanlis, upheld the strategic choices of the 
FPE on FYR Macedonia by supporting the socialist government vis-a-vis 
the 2001 insurgency (see Karamanlis’ article in Herald Tribune in 
Tziampiris, 2003: 123).  
The above intervening variables favoured by international opportunities 
resulted in the autonomy of the Greek FPE. As Constas had predicted in 
an early stage, ‘such decisions will not be attractive targets for 
exploitation by the opposition and that close interaction with the 
European environment of foreign policy will further narrow the distance 
between objective reality and its cognition’ (Constas, 1995: 75).  
c. Strategic adjustments 
From the late-1990s, Greece made effort to introduce a more 
institutionalised Balkan cooperation scheme by supporting, inter alia, 
the Charter on Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and 
Cooperation in Southeastern Europe (2000) and favouring initiatives of 
the EU: namely, the Stability Pact for region-building and the South-East 
European Cooperation Process. In the framework of the Stability Pact, 
Greece launched a fairly ambitious Hellenic Plan for the Economic 
                                                 
7 The role of the burgeoning Greek International Relations (IR) academia as an intervening 
variable seems ambiguous as for its contribution to the rationalisation of the then FPE. 
Certain scholars stress its failure to become forerunner of change (Tsakonas, 2005), while 
others are more optimistic (Constas, 1995). The role of academics in modernising Simitis’ 
FPE is barely mentioned in Keridis (Keridis, 2005). For a critical view regarding IR liberal 
scholars’ leverage in foreign policy, see Ifestos (Ifestos, 2005). 
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Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB) ‘an effort on the part of Greece 
to incorporate certain individual initiatives of development assistance 
into one single plan’
8
. The amount of $US 74 million was allocated to FYR 
Macedonia.  
The 2001 insurgency in FYR Macedonia, when an armed conflict began 
after an ethnic Albanian military group started attacking state forces, 
was an exogenous feedback for the Greek FPE. The security of the 
country was put into peril and thanks to the international community’s 
(American) intervention, a resolution was found taking the shape of the 
Ohrid Agreement, according to which the Slav Macedonians made 
several concessions on Albanian Macedonian rights. During the crisis, 
the Greek FPE accepted a Slav Macedonian request for military material 
aid. Additionally, Greece refused a call from Bulgaria for bilateral military 
intervention, by supporting a multinational military presence. In the 
midst of the crisis, Greece made high efforts and succeeded in the 
signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between FYR 
Macedonia and the EU so as to ensure the prospect of Albanian 
Macedonians within a united state (on this paragraph, Tziampiris, 2003: 
124). 
During the second model, the Greek FPE made new strategic 
adjustments by changing its foreign policy priorities, the means of 
foreign policy, its perception of both national security and the 
constructive role of international organisations. On account of 
favourable circumstances, the Greek FPE adopted a neoliberal 
accommodating strategy hoping that cooperation, institutional 
                                                 
8 See http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/HiPERB/ 
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deepening and widening and economic influence would bring medium 
term benefits to the Greek foreign policy. During that period, 
negotiation talks became a subordinate issue and fell into a ‘leisureliness 
state’ (Interview, Katsoudas), particularly after the 2001 crisis. 
Contrarily, the 2001 insurgency prompted Slav Macedonians to keep a 
more uncompromising stance by arguing that the name ‘Republic of 
Macedonia’ would strengthen their internal stability and regional peace. 
The clear international threats and opportunities, the accommodating 
economic interest groups and an indifferent public opinion gave the 
Greek FPE the autonomy needed to shift its strategy towards a more 
rational approach: the fact that economic interests favoured the ‘De-
macedonisation’ of foreign policy (World 2 according to LRT) coincided 
with and facilitated (but did not impose) a position that was determined 
by international imperatives (World 1). Finally, in this model, the role of 
perceptions of the FPE was primordial: According to Tsakonas, ‘this 
transformation of Greek foreign policy was not exclusively born of 
changes at the international and regional level, but, rather it was the 
sequel to the conceptions of these developments by the Greek foreign 
policy makers’ (Tsakonas, 2005: 313).  
 
2.3. Third model (2006-2009) 
The third model of Greek foreign policy shift towards FYR Macedonia is 
one of clear international threat and opportunity assessment and an 
accommodating domestic environment for the Greek FPE, that both 
facilitate a rational and pragmatic strategic adjustment. This fact makes 
the decision to block FYR Macedonia one of World 1, according to LRT. In 
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this case, the international/regional system can better interpret the final 
foreign policy decisions. 
a. International threats/opportunities assessment 
In fact, the assessments affecting the NATO/EU blockage date from the 
aftermath of the 2001 insurgency crisis. Although the unyielding 
positions of FYR Macedonia with regard to its constitutional name were 
pretty much known since the 1990s, what troubled the Greek FPEs was 
the zero reciprocation of the Slav Macedonian FPE in regard to the 
accommodating strategic adjustment of Greece after the 2001 crisis and 
its staunch support for European integration (Tziampiris, 2003). Instead, 
the Slav Macedonian FPE stipulated that the Name Issue was unilateral 
dispute and the UN-sponsored negotiation process should lead to the 
unilateral usage of a name by the Greeks and not by the international 
community as a whole. Finally, it emphasised its right to self-
determination by underrating the validity of the pledges of the UN 
resolutions and the Interim Accord. 
Second, FYR Macedonia succeeded in its recognition by two thirds of the 
UN General Assembly members as ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in their 
bilateral relations, by turning its Permanent Representation in New York 
into an area of lobbying for its bilateral recognitions (Interview, 
Katsoudas). The ‘final blow’ came from the US: the first day of the 
second term of Bush administration, Washington announced its decision 
to use the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in its bilateral relations with 
Greece’s neighbour (November 2004). In his interview, Mr Valinakis 
suggests that the American recognition was designed to circumvent, 
inter alia, the Greek FPE’s objections with respect to the Name Issue as 
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expressed during the first Karamanlis’ visit to the US (May, 2004). 
Objections with regard to the Name Issue had also been expressed to 
the UK Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, by Minister Molyviatis 
and Μr Valinakis during the EU presidency of Great Britain in September 
2004. 
The increasing number of recognitions undermined the UN-sponsored 
negotiations for the Name Issue. Surprisingly, Greece reacted slowly to 
this. Mr Katsoudas stresses that when he took office (2007), there were 
neither diplomatic directives nor verbal note patterns or démarches on 
the issue: ‘Greece was taking no measure against these recognitions’ he 
insists, something he calls ‘inertia’.  
Third, we should further explain the US support of the Slav Macedonian 
constitutional name. Before 9/11, Americans persuaded Slav 
Macedonians to accept the Albanian Macedonian claims during the 2001 
crisis (Ohrid Agreement) by promising support for their name and full 
integration within the NATO structures (Burns, 2004: 7)
 9
.  After 9/11 the 
US started disengaging from the Balkans. Its implicit support, during the 
1990s, of Muslim Albanian military groups in Kosovo faded, while its 
main focus became the ‘War on Terror’ and Islamic fundamentalism. As 
for the Western Balkans, the strategic adjustment of the US FPE 
favoured small developing, albeit manipulable, nation-states willing to 
support American President Bush’s aspirations across the Globe.
10
 This 
took place by intervening in domestic ethnic disputes, which could 
                                                 
9 In this State Department edition, US’s increasing intentions become clear: ‘Allies new and 
old have an interest in assisting [‘Macedonia’] to meet the political, economic, and military 
requirements of NATO membership’ (Brzezinski, 2004: 12).  
10 FYR Macedonia became a member of ‘the coalition of willing’. 
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threaten ‘adverse effects’ on the overall regional stability 
(Arvanitopoulos, 2008).  
The Kostas Karamanlis FPE that succeeded the Simitis government in 
March 2004, during the first period, maintained a moderate position and 
supported the Slav Macedonian side in its European integration. First, at 
the December 2005 European Council, Greece voted in favour of giving 
FYR Macedonia the status of a candidate country, allowing for extra 
funding to flow from Brussels to Skopje. On this occasion, Greece 
managed to ensure the usage of the provisional name of FYR Macedonia 
in all EU documents (Interview, Valinakis)
11
.  
Second, another accommodating gesture of the Greek FPE was the 
speeding up of bilateral economic relations. In his interview, Mr 
Stylianidis underlined his role with respect to Greek initiatives towards 
bilateral collaboration in development projects (European Corridor No 
10 co-sponsored by Greece), the construction of a Greek oil pipeline that 
connects Thessaloniki with FYR Macedonia, and in a series of 
environmental issues with respect to Vardar river pollution. He also 
mentioned the re-activation of the HiPERB.    
b. Strategic adjustments 
Two independent international events played a primordial role in the 
Greek foreign policy strategic adjustment of the third model. The first 
                                                 
11 Before the European Council, Prime Minister Karamanlis had stated that lack of 
cooperation from Skopje to find a resolution under the UN for the Name Issue ‘is a 
parameter that bears highly upon its European perspective’. In the framework of the 
European Council, Foreign Minister Molyviatis and Mr Valinakis had informed the presidency 
and the member states that the common decision on FYR Macedonia did not constitute a 
‘blank cheque’ for the opening of membership talks with FYR Macedonia (Interview, 
Valinakis). 
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was the NATO enlargement which constituted an international 
opportunity for Greece. The second one was the new ultra-nationalistic 
government in Skopje. Both events provoked the pragmatic strategic 
adjustment of the Greek FPE and I posit both at the beginning of the 
third model accounting for the clear-cut World 1 case, according to LRT. 
First, although the Name Issue was a top priority for the Karamanlis 
administration since 2004, timing impacted the Greek FPE, when NATO 
seemed to invite FYR Macedonia for membership. According to research, 
this became clear in 2005: the person that introduced the idea of 
‘resolution of the Name Issue as a condition for the NATO accession of 
FYR Macedonia’ was Foreign Minister Molyviatis, in 2005 (Stylianidis, 
Interview). In reality, Greece was forced to act in response to the 
intention of its allies, mainly, the US. As Mr Valinakis reveals, the Greek 
FPE envisaged a prospective EU blocking of FYR Macedonia, but it was 
the chronological order of the NATO invitation that imposed the Greek 
blocking. 
Second, the new Slav Macedonian FPE (August 2006) facilitated the 
Greek decision in that, with a series of actions, it presented Greece, a 
member of NATO, no other alternative but to react. The Gruevski 
government revalidated a nationalistic policy, insisting on every occasion 
that Slav Macedonians are not a Slavic nation but direct descendants of 
Alexander the Great (Macedonist theory). Nationalistic manifestations 
can be found in instances of renaming central squares, avenues and 
airports with ancient Greek historical names, Gruevski’s wreathing of a 
monument depicting Greek Macedonia as a part of ‘Greater Macedonia’, 
etc. 
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The Greek FPE, perceiving the negative international climate manifested 
in international imperatives (stalemate of negotiations, rolling in of 
recognitions, US open support, Slav maximalist actions) and its past 
‘inertia’, and availing itself by an international opportunity, reformulated 
its adjustment. First, it tacitly reversed the multiparty decision of 1992 
(no name with the term ‘Macedonia’) by weighing that the majority of 
states use the name ‘Macedonia’ for their bilateral diplomatic 
relations
12
. Second, it defined the Greek position (something never fully 
clarified, hitherto) and set the Greek red lines: ‘a name with a 
geographical designation with erga omnes validity’ (Interviews, 
Stylianidis, Valinakis, confidential).  
Third, it proclaimed that ‘without a mutually acceptable solution, there 
can be no allied relations, no invitation for participation in the same 
Alliance’
13
. Fourth, it reformulated the Greek argumentation: it rejected 
the rather sentimental and history-centric argumentation of the first 
model by adjusting the Greek position to international agreements’ 
standards on good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation 
requirements as well as on national interest arguments (Interview, 
Valinakis); Greece emphasised that accepting a new member with an 
unresolved international dispute in a security club, NATO would lose its 
coherence – and thus raised issues of ‘political conditionality’ for 
candidate members (Interview, confidential). Last, it postponed the 
sponsoring of the European Corridor 10 and blocked European funding 
(Interview, confidential).  
                                                 
12 In fact, the term ‘Macedonia’ in various forms has been on the table of secret negotiations 
even before the 1992 Greek multi-party decision. 
13 Speech of the Prime Minister before the Greek Parliament (Feb. 2008). 
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As a result, a systematic preparation for the Bucharest NATO Summit 
lasted one year (confidential interview) by taking its final shape after the 
2007 Greek national elections (Interview, Katsoudas).  The Greek FPE did 
not send clear-cut messages about its definite decision to block FYR 
Macedonia until late 2007, because such messages would not leave 
space for last-time compromise: ‘our target was a resolution not a 
blockage’ (confidential interview). However, this made the US FPE 
calculate that Greeks, finally, would not block (see Lygeros, 2008). The 
Slav Macedonian FPE received erroneous messages that the US FPE 
would finally ‘control’ the Greek objections before or during the 
Bucharest Summit (Interview, Valinakis). 
With regard to the EU, the Greek FPE worked consistently to enrich the 
criteria of candidates’ admission to the EU by asking for further 
requirements regarding foreign policy issues, and neighbourly relations 
between a candidate state and the member-states (Interview, Valinakis). 
Mr Valinakis highlights that, in the previous enlargement process of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), foreign policy issues were not 
prioritised by the EU for political reasons. 
c. Domestic variables  
The Greek FPE’s decision to declare that it accepts the term ‘Macedonia’ 
with a geographical designation for FYR Macedonia’s name, did not 
receive any serious public protestations. The fact that the ‘De-
macedonisation’ of the Greek foreign policy of 1995-2006 had an impact 
on public opinion was obvious. Although polls illustrated that public 
opinion did not want the term ‘Macedonia’ for their neighbours’ name 
(67%), simultaneously, it fully supported the red lines posed by the 
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government (80%) (Metron Analysis, 2008)
14
. That said, what tilted the 
Greek public opinion towards a rather moderate position with respect to 
FYR Macedonia’s name could be explored in the question ‘do you think 
that FYROM is a threat for your country?’. 69% of the respondents say 
‘No’ (Public Issue, 2008a).  
It seems that public opinion did not express itself in the way Kaplan had 
described for the Greeks of the early 1990s
15
. After all, Greek public 
opinion became an accommodating variable for the FPE’s blocking, while 
its engagement became undesirable. Mr Valinakis emphasizes that the 
government did not favour a ‘bumbling engagement’ of domestic 
protestations against Slav Macedonians, because it would harm the 
Greek national interests. 
As for the Greek opposition parties, only the populist right-wing party 
LAOS expressed its discomfort with the rejection of the 1992 decision 
but its reaction had no duration
16
. The other parties fully consented to 
the government’s red lines. Notably, the socialist major opposition party 
(PASOK) supports the government by criticising Gruevski’s government, 
while SYRIZA, a leftist party, that sometimes its members have 
expressed sympathetic positions for Slav Macedonian claims, consents 
to both red lines and the intent of the Greek blocking
17
.  
                                                 
14 In general, public opinion continued to consider that the issues of foreign policy are of low 
importance. ‘Foreign Policy’ occupied the seventh position in the question ‘which is the most 
important problem for Greece?’ (2.7%) (Metron Analysis, 2007).  
15 Into ‘Does FYR Macedonia need Greece to survive as a country?’ ‘Yes’ say 90% (Public 
Issue, 2008b). 
16 For a contrary view, see Agnantopoulos, 2010:10. 
17 Kalaitzidis has a similar idea for the accommodating role of domestic politics regarding the 
third model (see Kalaitzidis, 2010: 139, 146). Arguably, the Greek blocking decision was not 
based on domestic politics, because the popular mandate of the Karamanlis government was 
quite fresh. 
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Again, the role of the mass media during this period is moderate though 
sporadically broadcasting Gruevski’s nationalistic statements and 
stressing his FPE’s ‘arrogant behaviour’. Yet, one part of media that we 
would call ‘attentive media’ or ‘elite analysts’ were either criticising the 
Greek FPE’s inertia of the second model towards FYR Macedonia 
(Lygeros, 2008, Delastik, 2007) or in line with a premise that the Name 
Issue has become an absurd issue Greece should disengage or resign 
from
18
. For instance, a well-known Greek analyst’s article, one year 
before the 2008 NATO Summit, was entitled ‘the Balkans loser’ arguing 
that Greeks are entrapped in a lost contest (Papahelas, 2007).  
After the September 2007 elections, the Karamanlis administration 
ensured the blocking alternative and instructed the Greek Foreign 
Minister, Bakoyannis, to implement the strategic choice. The FPE 
commenced an attempt to inform all NATO partners on its intention to 
object to FYR Macedonia’s accession (Interviews, Valinakis, confidential). 
One of Mr Katsoudas’ missions was to visit the US to mitigate American 
FPE’s reactions on the Greek decision and inform US academia on the 
new Greek foreign policy adjustment (January 2008); Greece attempted 
to approach in secret the Bulgarian government and influence Bulgaria’s 
position in the Summit (Interview, Katsoudas). With Mr Valinakis’ 
diplomatic efforts, a number of states that had recognised the 
constitutional name of FYR Macedonia, declared that they will 
henceforth use the provisional name ‘FYR Macedonia’ in their bilateral 
and international relations by respecting the resolutions 817 and 845 of 
the UN. 
                                                 
18 For the impact of ‘elite media’ in the shaping of elite opinion and foreign policy, see Baum 
and Potter, 2008. 
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Greece succeeded in institutionalising an international dispute by 
making the resolution of it a criterion for the accession of FYR 
Macedonia to NATO
19
. During the summit, ‘the Greek FPE touched with 
a rather technocratic argumentation the ‘post-modern’ members, while 
it received condescending reactions from its traditional allies’ (Interview, 
Katsoudas). France, Bulgaria, Spain, Romania and Iceland supported the 
Greek objections (confidential interview).  After the NATO blocking, the 
Greek FPE followed the same pattern regarding the EU membership 
talks with FYR Macedonia. The Council of the European Union has lately 
adopted similar phrasing in its conclusions on enlargement/stabilisation 
and association process of 5 December 2011. Domestically, the red lines 
and the NATO/EU blockage have become a political dependence path for 
the next socialist and the transitional Greek FPE. In this sense, the third 
model could have been extended for the period 2006-2011.  
 
3.  Permeable Perceptions’: an intuitive analysis of Greek 
Foreign Policy Behaviour towards FYR Macedonia 
From the previous analysis of the Greek foreign policy change results the 
relationship between international threats/opportunities, the 
state/society relations and FPE’s strategic adjustments towards FYR 
Macedonia. According to Neo-classical realism, ‘there is no perfect 
transmission belt linking the relative distribution of power and the 
                                                 
19 In paragraph 20 of the Bucharest Summit Declaration it is stated that ‘Within the 
framework of the UN, many actors have worked hard to resolve the name issue, but the 
Alliance has noted with regret that these talks have not produced a successful outcome.  
Therefore we agreed that an invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will 
be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.  
We encourage the negotiations to be resumed without delay and expect them to be 
concluded as soon as possible’. 
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states’ foreign policy behaviour’ (Taliaferro, 2006). This implies, inter 
alia, that the historical analysis of the patterns of behaviour based on 
the LRT Worlds suggested in this essay is at the moment incomplete.  
An intuitive analysis of the FPE’s perceptions is further required. Foreign 
policy perceptions on threats/opportunities and security dilemmas are 
called ‘permeable perceptions’, because their hard core often conflicts 
with elements of dynamism or immobility, dissimilating states’ actions in 
time or place, something that neorealist analysts fail to mention (see 
footnote 2). Hence, perceptions had an impact on Greek behaviour 
during the three models, and, therefore, played a decisive role in the 
Greek blocking. 
 
3.1. Security perceptions 
Reflecting on the previous analysis, we discern two diametrically 
opposed trends that affected the FPE security perceptions: Nationalism 
and Globalisation. Nationalism pertains to common identity beliefs, 
historical memories, and necessity engendering realities in the present. 
In the Western Balkans ‘still almost Middle Ages on the eastern edge of 
the European Renaissance’ (Glykatsi-Arveler, 2010), nationalism remains 
redundant and late. Macedonia as a part of an erstwhile Ottoman 
Empire’s hierarchical system saw in the face of national awakenings a 
perennial struggle between the three historical nations of Greeks, 
Bulgarians and Serbians and ‘the rivalry between their patrons’ that 
culminated in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Kontogiorgi, 2006)
20
. 
                                                 
20 After 1878, Bulgarians launched a struggle for the separation of Macedonia from the 
Ottomans, envisaged in the Treaty of San Stefano. For this purpose, organizations, such as 
the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), started a revolutionary 
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Historical memories of hatred and bloodshed fed by recurrent patterns 
of neighbours’ behaviours constructed a nationalism that is in need of 
the state-psyche which constitutes a state/shelter for a nation in stark 
contrast to the liberal theorising of state as a state/medium for a society 
(see Brown, 2001). Reasonably, the collapse of a later hierarchical 
system (Yugoslavia) automatically brings about the re-emergence of the 
same patterns and thence insecurity for Greece, something that 
Featherstone has, succinctly, called ‘the shock of the old’ (Featherstone, 
1996).   
Morgenthau defines national security as ‘the irreducible minimum that 
diplomacy must defend with adequate power without compromise’ 
(Morgenthau, 1948: 382). Briefly, Greece’s geographical proximity to the 
Western Balkans has been influencing its perceptions of national 
security. Thus, a neighbour’s use of the term ‘Macedonia’ relativises the 
security dilemmas: it awakens the feeling of potential threat in the 
future against its territory, while it subverts Greek History facts and self-
beliefs. Buzan confirms this by stressing that ‘security also rests on 
ideational bases’ (Buzan, 1991). As a result, Greek nationalism 
counterbalances the Slav Macedonian nationalism of the early 1990s or 
that embodied in Gruevski’s rhetoric
21
, a state’s reaction alien to the 
                                                                                                                                            
struggle urging all nations of Macedonia to revolt. Yet, Bulgaria privileged a manipulation of 
the local population by favouring a Bulgarian Macedonian identity for all Macedonians. 
Later, Greece organised its own engagement in the region to protect the Greek population. 
Harsh treatment by Bulgarians provoked the disengagement of a large part of Slavs from 
Bulgarians paving the way for a distinct Macedonian identity in parallel with a mixing with 
socialist ideas of the time. With the advent of Tito and the intervention of Stalin, the idea of 
a Macedonian federation resurfaced. During the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), most of Slav 
Macedonians were compelled to leave Greece for their role in the secession of Greek 
Macedonia. Thereafter, Tito cultivated the idea of a distinct ‘Macedonian nation’ that has 
territorial affinities to Greek Macedonia (Kofos, 1964).  
21 Gruevski’s party VMRO-DPMNE is the successor of the 1893 established IMRO. 
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mainstream concept of security dilemmas which are based on purely 
economic and military capabilities’ perceptions of states. 
Conversely, globalisation is the spreading of liberal prescriptions in both 
a global and local scale, with an impact on political, social, economic and 
cultural relations. It can involve an alternative to the nation-state. 
However, it is the states with their actions that may determine the level 
of globalization’s penetration. ‘States in stable regions have had their 
security policies affected by globalisation the most, whereas those in 
regions of enduring conflict have been affected the least’ (Paul, Ripsman, 
2010).  
The globalisation of liberal principles has stigmatised the Greek FPE and 
society, mainly, after 1995 (see Ioakimidis, 1996)
22
. Alongside economic 
interdependence, a promising aspect of globalisation is cooperation 
through international organisations or communities of prosperity. It is 
not a coincidence that, since 1999, Greece has adopted as for Turkey a 
‘pushing policy’ towards ‘difficult and modernizing paths of European 
integration, whereby Athens hopes for an entrapment of Ankara under 
strong multilateral regimes which can stabilise the aspirations of their 
members and satisfy their security needs in a logic of absolute profits’ 
(Ifantis, 2005: 438).  
Indeed, Greece imagined the West Balkan EU enlargement in the same 
way. The ‘win-lose’-oriented logic of the early 1990s seemed inactive. As 
a result, globalisation had a share in the FPE’s perceptions and 
contributed to envisage security on a differentiated basis: becoming 
                                                 
22 The impact of Globalisation on decisions of the FPE as a ‘structural power’ is alluded in 
Brown and Ainley, 2009: 100. For Lobell, ‘systemic structural forces shape the broad 
parameters of a state’s behaviour’ (Lobell, 2009: 62). 
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with respect to the second model, more rational, and with regard to the 
third model more pragmatic. 
The use of a liberal dividend served rational instincts of a part of FPE of a 
state proximate to an area of instability. Within this context, one has to 
evaluate what Sterling-Folker argues about liberal theories: ‘liberal 
theories ignore nationalism and unilateralism entirely or treat them as 
irrational ‘historical residues’ to be overcome through ever greater 
institutionalised cooperation’ (Sterling-Folker, 2009). In her research, 
Sterling-Folker suggested that profit in economic relations between 
Beijing and Taipei was not sufficient to eliminate the peril that 
accumulates in the historical memories of China and Taiwan (Sterling-
Folker, 2009). This can be juxtaposed with the almost zero impact of 
Greek economic penetration in FYR Macedonia on solving the Name 
Issue. 
In fact, the antagonism of immobility (nationalism) and dynamism 
(globalisation) remains a continuous process with an impact on 
threat/opportunity assessments, state/society relations and states’ 
strategic adjustments. This concurs with Mastanduno’s observation that 
‘the liberal order remains an ongoing project’ (Mastanduno, 2009). 
Hence, the process of westernisation of FYR Macedonia is not a 
teleological process. Regarding Greece, so long as Europeanisation of the 
Western Balkans remains doubtful, nationalism would impact the FPE’s 
behaviour towards FYR Macedonia, leaving the Name Issue an important 
security issue.  
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3.2. Power perceptions 
Power constitutes another ‘permeable perception’. According to Carr, 
‘power is indivisible and the military and economic weapons are merely 
different instruments of power’ (Carr, 1946: 111). For some, it can be 
seen as an attribute. This makes power a rather measurable criterion of 
a state’s material and intangible capabilities. Yet, power is a rather 
complex notion: power is a relational concept that relates influence 
exerted from one state to another. However, influence becoming a 
synonym of power has less to do with capabilities: relational power can 
be measured ‘only in terms of action, in the effect one state has on 
another’ (Brown, Ainley, 2009: 93). After all, measuring the influence of 
a state becomes rather difficult. For Brown and Ainley:  
‘power is the ability to resist change, to throw the costs of adaptation on 
to others, and, characteristically, the ability to resist change requires 
fewer resources to be placed on the line than the ability to bring change 
about’ (Brown, Ainley, 2009: 95). 
‘Perceptions of power are more dynamic than measurements of material 
relationships’ (Wohlforth, 1993: 294). The three models suggest that the 
Greek FPE did not grasp the chance given by the Interim Accord. Its 
strategic adjustment to a neoliberal foreign policy based on soft power 
did not result in a mutually acceptable solution for the Name Issue. This 
was ex post facto a matter of negotiating power in that Greece should 
have changed a position that FYR Macedonia seemed able to resist. The 
Greek FPE had to be on the offensive not the defensive during 
negotiations.  
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Analysing the Name Issue, Zahariadis points out: ‘Success in 
international negotiations is, mainly, a function of strategy, not power’ 
(Zahariadis, 2003). Ultimate proof of the success of Slav Macedonians is 
the Greek retreat regarding the use of the term ‘Macedonia’. Moreover, 
Slav Macedonians satisfied with the Interim Accord developed an 
independent approach by working out their strategy outside the 
framework of negotiations. Greece’s influence on the Slav Macedonian 
FPE was overbalanced by the influence of Slav Macedonians in terms of 
an ‘outside-negotiations logic’ (recognitions’ rolling in, networking in the 
UN, good relations with the US President Bush strategy); the negotiation 
process automatically acted at the expense of Greece.   
For Brown and Ainley, ‘the ability to control what gets on to the agenda 
is more important than the ability to determine what happens when 
items are actually raised in discussion’ (2009: 98). After 2006, Slav 
Macedonians did not reject the role of the UN negotiations (although 
arguing that the Name issue is a unilaterally imposed ‘absurd’ issue). 
Instead, they asked for recognition of their national identity and 
language in the final agreement.  
Greece’s inability to exert its power towards FYR Macedonia and impose 
a solution can be viewed through two lenses: one pessimist on which 
Greece was inadequate in transforming its hegemonic presence in the 
Balkans into substantial influence, and one optimist where international 
processes of negotiations treated two states as equal irrespective of 
their power distribution. However, these two functions probably worked 
in parallel.  
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3.3. National interest perceptions 
Finally, we examine a third ‘permeable perception’: the national interest. 
According to Gilpin, a state has a number of political, economic, and 
ideological objectives which are dictated by national interests and to 
defend its most vital interests a state is ready to go to war (Gilpin, 1981: 
25). Borrowing a phrase of Charles Evans Hughes, Carr insisted that 
‘foreign policy is the result of the national interest which is based on real 
emergency or stands in the historical perspective’. For a realist like Carr, 
‘any such interpretation of reality is, finally, deterministic’ (Carr, 1946).  
On the contrary, for Neo-classical realists, ‘the process of identifying 
national interests is not a given...a wide variety of domestic political 
factors may influence this process’ (Dueck, 2009: 146). In this way, 
regardless of the role of power in bilateral negotiations or an alleged 
Greek FPE inertia
23
, the national interest of Greeks was revised, during 
the second model, in view of FPE’s assessments of the international 
opportunities (juxtapose Taliaferro, 2009: 224).  
In any case, the reformulation of the FPE’s goals vis-a-vis FYR Macedonia 
as a buffer state and the ‘modernisation’ of Greek society had an impact 
on the outcome of negotiations. Besides, the lack of interest of the 
public opinion in foreign policy issues posed no significant obstacles to 
the FPE. From a reverse standpoint, Sarah Kreps has argued that the 
convergence of main political parties regarding the FPEs’ strategic 
decisions makes leaders be ‘less concerned about being outflanked or 
losing votes to competitors’ (Kreps, 2010).  In fact, these two narrations 
                                                 
23 The so-called inertia was possibly a result of two separate phenomena: the deterioration 
of the Greek negotiating power and the shift in Greek national interest. 
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had some effects with regard to the Greek FPE’s autonomy from society 
with an impact on national interest perceptions. 
Both the historical and the intuitive analysis of Greek Foreign Policy 
towards FYR Macedonia regarding the Name Issue sought to give a 
comprehensive answer to the primary question of this essay: ‘Why did 
Greece block the Euro-Atlantic integration of FYR Macedonia’. The Greek 
resorting to international organisations has an ambiguous meaning. It is 
either proof of lack of power and influence in the region or proof that 
being member of international communities of security and prosperity 
implies veto power. Either way, the role of security organisations within 
a post-Cold War environment regarding the FPEs’ strategic adjustments 
seems remarkable. As for NATO, Mastanduno, clearly, suggests that 
‘NATO is no longer focused on a common external threat and its 
members do not necessarily share the same security priorities, as 
evidenced by the alliance conflict over Iraq in 2003’ (Mastanduno, 2009). 
Against the rhetoric of the Bush Administration that ‘it is the mission 
that determines the Coalition not the process’ (Patrick, 2009), the 2008 
Bucharest Summit could be characterised as one victory of institutions.  
Notwithstanding, the Greek blocking has to be evaluated under the 
prism of timing as an international opportunity. Timing can offer 
pressure to a negotiating part which is one of the traditional instruments 
of diplomacy (Morgenthau, 1948: 388), but timing, by definition, cannot 
stay for long. Thus far, Greece has not grasped the opportunity given by 
the blocking, hoping that Slav Macedonians will change their maximalist 
position in order to embrace the benefits of the Euro-Atlantic 
integration.    
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Instead, it is indicative that after the NATO Bucharest Summit, the Slav 
Macedonian FPE proceeded in three aggressive tactical moves: a. FYR 
Macedonia filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice in 
November 2008 accusing Greece of a ‘blatant violation’ of international 
law (article 11 of the Interim Accord) in blocking its bid to join NATO
24
, b. 
Gruevski sent an official letter to his Greek counterpart Karamanlis (July 
2008) asking for a recognition of the ‘Macedonian’ minority in Greece, 
and full enjoyment of its members’ rights and asked for a return of the 
Slavs that were expatriated after the Greek Civil War, in late 1940s, c. 
FYR Macedonia stepped up its maximalist policy at home by renaming 
roads and squares with ancient Greek names and erecting a giant 
Alexander of Macedon statue in central Skopje (June 2011).  
 
4. Conclusions  
The Greek FPE’s strategic adjustment towards FYR Macedonia evolved 
influenced by external stimuli and the relation between state and Greek 
society. Over the course of two decades, international threats have been 
replaced by international opportunities. What is more, prosperity in 
Greek society distanced the impact of public opinion and the electorate 
on the FPE, which indicated an important change in the structure of 
intervening variables. In the first place, these had an impact on the 
rationalisation of Greek adjustment to the external feedback of the 2001 
insurgency, the new threats’ assessments in the region and the dictates 
of the international community.  
                                                 
24 To read the judgment of 5 December 2011 of the International Court of Justice: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf.  
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Yet, the new adjustment of neoliberal foreign policy of the second model 
did not properly weigh the factor of nationalism that sometimes can 
spring despite the callings of globalisation and a series of security 
dilemmas fully identified with the historical context of the region. The 
new ultra-nationalistic government in Skopje was a stark contrast to the 
accommodating Greek behaviour with respect to FYR Macedonia and led 
to a reformulation of Greek FPE adjustment towards a more pragmatic 
one (NATO, EU blocking), as first degree research revealed. This 
reformulation seems unchangeable, at present. 
Within this context, we have to take into account a. the role of the US 
support for the Slav Macedonian FPE during the Bush Administration, b. 
the imbalance of negotiating power against Greece, on account of either 
an ‘outside-negotiations logic’ of FYR Macedonia or a probable Greek 
inertia with respect to this logic, c. the new foreign policy priorities for 
Greece regarding her national interests. Finally, we have to consider the 
current role of international organisations regarding states’ actions.  
The globalisation and European socialisation of the Greek FPE in the 
2000s assisted Greece in assessing, first, more rationally and, next, more 
pragmatically the Name Issue by affecting the strategic assessments of 
the FPE, the role of intervening variables, and the strategic adjustments 
of the FPE. To this effect, the timing of the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process itself propelled by the US and the EU was a catalyst. 
Morgenthau argued ‘a nation can only take a rational view of its national 
interests after it has parted company with the crusading spirit of the 
political creed’ and added ‘compromise on any issue, however minor, is 
impossible so long as both sides are not secure in their national 
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interests’ (Morgenthau, 1978: 384). This opens up a new discussion 
about what is, indeed, the national interest of Slav Macedonians and 
how they could provide a rather rational/pragmatic view of it with 
respect to the Name Issue, which could be the subject of a separate 
essay. 
As for the LRT Worlds, they can plausibly serve as ‘a methodological 
compass’ insofar as a state’s behaviour change in time can range 
through different ‘level of analysis’ causations. In Part 1 of this paper, it 
was illustrated that there was a shift of the Greek Foreign Policy 
behavior: a clear tendency to move from a quasi-World 3 case –where 
intervening variables were of high importance– towards a World 1 case, 
whereby decisions taken were closer to the assessment of the 
international and regional environment, was highlighted.  
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